The Red Sea blockade imposed by the Houthis rremains in place, inflicting significant economic harm on both Israel and Egypt. As the conflict drags on, international observers have begun to question whether the current U.S.-led air campaign is sufficient—or whether only a broader ground operation will ultimately bring the Houthis to heel.
Since the start of the latest campaign overnight on March 15–16, the Trump administration has launched twice as many airstrikes as the Biden administration did over a 13-month period. According to U.S. Central Command, the operation has targeted over 800 Houthi sites, killing hundreds of fighters, including senior figures.
The Pentagon claims the strikes have had tangible effects: ballistic missile launches by the Houthis have dropped by 69 percent, while drone attacks have declined by 55 percent. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) reported at least 351 U.S. strikes over six weeks—America’s highest monthly total since 2017.
Yet the campaign’s main objective—halting Houthi aggression toward Israel and securing Red Sea shipping lanes—has not been achieved.
According to The Financial Times, the U.S. is still grappling with a dilemma that eluded President Joe Biden and even Saudi Arabia before him: how to significantly degrade Houthi military capabilities and end the attacks without being drawn into a costly, protracted war with no clear endgame.
Though U.S. strikes have forced the rebel group’s senior leadership into hiding and reportedly destroyed critical infrastructure and weapons depots, Houthi forces continue to stage weekly rallies in Sanaa, showcasing anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment. The group has also managed to inflict damage on U.S. forces, albeit limited. In one recent incident, an American F-18 fighter jet plunged into the sea from the USS Harry S. Truman as its crew attempted to evade a Houthi attack.
“I haven’t seen an ability to make the Houthis desperate for a pause,” Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told the Financial Times. “When I’ve spoken with people in the U.S. government, many seem consistently baffled by the Houthi calculus.”
According to Alterman, one of the core challenges is that the Houthis derive their legitimacy, in part, from opposition to the United States. They also have a “lot of patience,” he added.
Under the Biden administration, the U.S. also attempted to deter the Houthis through airstrikes, albeit at a slower pace. But the group, hardened by years of Saudi bombardment and fortified by an extensive network of tunnels and bunkers in Yemen’s northern mountains, remained largely undeterred.
Former U.S. ambassador Dan Shapiro, who served in the Biden administration, said officials eventually concluded that “probably we’re going to need to kill some Houthi leaders to change their policy.” However, he noted that such a move raised political concerns about implicitly supporting rival Yemeni factions—something the administration was reluctant to do.
Former Pentagon official Dana Stroul described the current U.S. operation as “the most significant sustained air campaign the U.S. military has carried out since the height of the ‘defeat ISIS’ war more than a decade ago.”
While the barrage of airstrikes may be taking a toll on the Houthis, speculation has mounted about whether anti-Houthi factions—or even Yemen’s internationally recognized government—will attempt to seize the opportunity to launch a renewed ground offensive. Such an operation could reignite the civil war that was effectively frozen in 2022 following a truce between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
However, two senior Yemeni officials from anti-Houthi camps told the Financial Times that while discussions have taken place with the U.S., there are no immediate plans for a ground operation. They cited not only strategic hesitation but also the devastating humanitarian consequences such an escalation could bring in war-ravaged Yemen, where life expectancy hovers around 63.
“We’re telling them to achieve their objectives; there needs to be something on the ground and the region [Saudi Arabia and the UAE] has to be involved,” one official said. “But there’s still skepticism.” With Riyadh and Abu Dhabi publicly denying involvement in any renewed offensive—after years of costly entanglement—Yemeni leadership appears paralyzed. “Everyone is waiting for the other one to move,” the official added.
Farea al-Muslimi, a researcher at Chatham House in London, said the Houthis could be seriously weakened by a combined air-and-ground campaign involving southern Yemeni factions. But such an effort would require close coordination among the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UAE and groups that have failed to oust the Houthis for nearly a decade.
With the campaign’s endgame unclear, questions remain about the long-term effectiveness of the U.S. effort. Shapiro noted that while the Biden administration’s earlier strikes destroyed hundreds of weapons depots, “at the end of the day, they have many more than hundreds, and they can keep building." “They’ve got an indigenous capability and they are still smuggling” from Iran, said Shapiro.
The U.S. recently issued direct warnings to Iran, vowing to respond “at the time and place of our choosing” over its continued support for the Houthis.
Stroul also cautioned about the toll the Red Sea campaign is taking on American military readiness. “They’ve pulled so much out of the Asia-Pacific theatre for this campaign in the Red Sea,” she said. "So, how long are they willing to go on, and where’s the pain point for them?